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WHY WE NEED THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
KARL N. LLEWELLYN*
TnE BAsIc EXPERIENCE
Eighty years ago bankers were swearing at the law of Bills and
Notes (mostly Notes) and swearing by the two fat volumes of Daniel.
Not that Daniel met the need. Paper ran across state lines, but law
didn't. In addition, the law of the paper was tangled and often obscure: there were three or four different rules, for instance, on the
"anomalous indorser," and what was the status of a "referee in case of
need"? Still, bankers and their lawyers simply had to make out with
conflict and with obscurity. James Coolidge Carter had just led the
Wall Street Bar and Wall Street Opinion into clear and conclusive
understanding that to codify is to kill and that man's wit cannot in
our system reach to produce by way of statutory language a workable
clarity and reckonability together with a reasonable flexibility. It was
all very sad, and there was nothing to do but go on suffering. It was
the kind of thing on which everybody knew that Wall Street, like
Papa, knows best.
Except that, then, in 1897, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws produced the uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law. For twenty-five hundred pages of Daniel they proposed to substitute twenty-five pages of code language, much of which
an ordinary man can understand. For forty or fifty divergent bodies of
law they proposed to substitute a single body. Where possible, they
proposed to simplify and clarify matters which the cases had left obscure. Wall Street knew indeed that these goals were impossible, but
somehow the N. I. L. got passed, all over the country, and bankers
started to live with it and to live by it. The N. I. L. of course came
-A.B. 1915, LL.B. 1918, J.D. 1920, Yale University; Chief Reporter, Uniform
Commercial Code, for Conference on Uniform State Laws and American Law Institute; author of Cases and Materials on the Law of Sales, The Bramble Bush,

and other books on legal subjects; Professor of Law, University of Chicago.

[367]

HeinOnline -- 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 367 1957

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
under immediate severe and widely publicized attack. James Barr
Ames, for instance, found a dozen fly specks on it, a few of which were
real. Nevertheless, the legislatures kept adopting the N. I. L. and
the governors kept signing it and the bankers not only lived under
it but found they could rather easily train every last bank clerk to
understand it reasonably well. If the surety was the ancient darling
of the chancellor, surely the N. I. L. has become the commercial
banker's darling.
Did the N. I. L. then stop litigation? It did not. But I have
never seen or heard it suggested that that new body of statutory text,
despite its novel language and concepts (e.g., "defect in title," "holder
in due course"), increased litigation. That is not all. There were
bankers and there were lawyers around, in plenty, when I first met
the practice of banking law, who had lived through the transition
from Danielic chaos to the novel statutory text, had lived through the
days when the N. 1. L. was the law not of all states but only of such
venturesome states here and there as had made the plunge, the days
when no Brannan's Annotations had appeared to make available the
cases which have sometimes read unhappy meanings into the text.
The tales told by those elder statesmen of the early 'twenties did not
run, however, in terms of any violent unsettlement of law and practice by way of the codification; rather did they report an easing in
advice and in research and in argument. How indeed could it be
otherwise, as life is lived outside the superstition-haunted imaginations of occasional lawyers? A well-drawn code section is forced into
sharper formulation than an author's text can normally reach. The
long process of discussion has opened up and taken account of more
possibilities than any author or set of authors can normally think out.
The more compact and simpler result is not only a fresh start
which clarifies, it is also easier and quicker to get at, and the fact that
it rests on conscious theory lends it guidesomeness.
Things simply are that way: good underlying theory works out in
language which shapes predictable answers to cases wholly unforeseen at the time of drafting, answers "forefeelable" in the same way
that good case law is. This can be seen in the later history of the N. I.
L. It has, in the main, proved amazingly flexible and, within its
flexibility, quite as predictable (if not more so) as was the preceding
case law. Consider: since 1897 there has been a revolutionary change
in the commercial-financial and the investment markets, there have
been one intervening severe panic and the great depression, there
have been two intervening world wars. But the N. I. L. is still
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doing moderately well, and even after sixty years of case law it is still
easier (save on a few points such as notice of defects) to find answers
in an annotated N. I. L. than it used to be in Daniel.
Of course there has long been need for revision. Bonds, for instance, have no business to be lumped with short-term paper. Checks
need much more attention than the N. I. L. affords. The law of confidential clerks, of protest, of "words of description," of "restrictive indorsement," and of forty other particular matters is in need of clarification or modernization or both. The law of notice to a purchaser
desperately needs the clarification which the Code has gotten into a
single page of text. It will be good to have the law of drafts in a set
(like that on bills of lading in a set) so stated that it can be understood. And so forth.
But the points remain:
(1) The fresh start taken in 1897 against all "expert" advice
has worked out so well that some tend today to see the
text as verging on the holy.
(2) The price of the innovation, in confusion or uncertainty
and rigidity, has been relatively small.
(3) The gain in clarity, above all in accessibility, ease and cheapness of use, and in the provision of an easy and effective
filing system for the ensuing cases, has been tremendous.
(4) So also the gain has been tremendous in contacts by the
interested layman with his law. This is no negligible value.
The relevant layman has pride in this, his law, which is
good for any citizen, especially in these days. He has reasonable understanding of it, which means (a) that he can
follow advice accurately and intelligently, which cheapens
business for him and for the consumer; and (b) that he
can spot where and when he needs to turn to the legal expert, which in turn means risks avoided rather than incurred, which again cheapens business for us all.
(5) Finally, to the degree that the law has become not only
more certain in fact but easier to find and also to see (or
feel) in advance as certain, that result makes for easy and
for fair settlements. This is of particular value to the business or bank which is negotiating with an outfit of gigantic financial resources, because either inaccessibility
or obscurity in the governing law can offer false color to
bargaining positions which, though they be taken in ig-
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norance or in arbitrariness, and despite any ultimate victory, can yet be most inconvenient and expensive to contest
in court.
THE CURRENT SITUATION

Statutory Commercial Law
The course pioneered by the N. I. L. has been followed, and followed with success, in many other parts of our commercial law. The
Uniform Sales Act appeared in 1906, with its most spectacular reform,
the new and sharp cleavage of documents of title sharply into the
"order" and the straight, bringing sudden clarity of law and practice
into a whole area of commercial finance. The Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act of the same year became the bible of the warehouse
industry. The year 1910 saw both the Bills of Lading Act and the
Stock Transfer Act. The Conditional Sales Act of 1918 made less
headway, but the Trust Receipts Act of 1933 was again a notable success in adoption and in practice. A considerable number of widely
accepted commercial acts, moreover, have occupied considerable areas
without the benefit of the Conference's balanced judgment and its
tradition of expert draftsmanship: for instance, the family of Bulk
Sales Acts, the series of acts (especially that on bank collection) sponsored by the American Bankers Association, the act in regard to inventory finance ("factor's act") urged by the finance companies, and
the two warring families of acts on assignment of accounts receivable.
The results are clear to see:
(1) The value, to lawyer, banker, and businessman, of simply
stated, well-drawn statutory commercial law which makes
working sense - that value has been demonstrated so often
and so unmistakably that the question, Can a code work?,
is settled forever: It can. And the question, Does a code
materially further cheapness and certainty in business
and banking operation, and in business and banking counseling, settlement, and litigation? - that question also is
settled forever: It does. Similarly settled forever, and again
with a resounding aye, is the question, Can reasonable adjustment, growth, and readjustment be achieved within the
frame of a reasonably well-drawn commercial statute? As
with the N. I. L., the better done portions of these other
commercial acts have proved astonishingly adjustable, even
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while giving solid guidance to any lawyer who is willing
to counsel and draft as any good lawyer ought to, to wit,
never to the outermost possible edge, always within an
engineering factor or margin "of safety."
(2) The occupation of the commercial field by these existing
statutes is haphazard, and it is as spotty as measles, the
edges and gaps being unplanned and bewildering. To
fill out and to organize would tremendously ease speed of
access to the material and to the cases under it.
(3) Individual statutes drafted one by one over fifty years
and more, by different persons under different circumstances
and with different points of view, run of necessity in perplexingly different directions. The extreme example is the
chattel security field, starting with the family of chattel
mortgage statutes, which hark back to the first Elizabeth,
and proceeding with completely different bodies of detailed
rule, detailed technique, and detailed policy through conditional sale, bailment-lease, trust receipt, the "lien under
a factor's act," field storage, receivables assignment, and
what have you more. Rare and costly expert knowledge is
called for in this area; and, even when such expert knowledge may be at hand, a general inventory lien on a moving
stock of goods is commonly almost impossible of manageable attainment. For the Code to bring such a welter into
a simplified, unified, functional scheme -one, too, readily
accessible to any intelligent lawyer - has been a major
achievement. Let it be noted further, that even such a result
needs to be worked out and then put to work in the light
of the commercial and financial whole picture: for instance,
no chattel security devices, in regard to those wares which
do not readily maintain identity, can alone suffice to meet
financial need, however those security devices be improved.
There is always to be considered the need of fresh financing
or of new suppliers, which an open-ended blanket lien will
bar out. One thus requires, for use at need, not only provisions for purchase-money liens but also such a device as
the letter of credit, that relatively unfamiliar but highly
useful machinery of finance and payment which the Code
in Article 5 presents in simple and convenient form.
Not only divergent approaches among individual comparable bod-
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ies of law but also changing outside conditions may call for rather
severe remodeling of an older statute or body of statutes. Thus the
modern bond market dates from the First World War, and its intricacies only from the flaming 'twenties; all of that was unthought of
when the N. I. L. made its attempt to deal with bonds as merely an
incidental subvariant of the simple commercial note. The bond, today, has long come to need the treatment the Code gives it (Article
8) as an "investment security," along with certificates of stock or of
participation, and the like; and the registered bond calls also for its
due attention.
To state (1) - (2) - (3) in a word: The general aims of commercial
statutes can be highly furthered by recanvass of the field as a whole
and in terms of the modern and foreseeable needs - using experience
to help distinguish passing fad from the more permanent trend. This
the Code has done. It has also greatly added to existing coverage,
filling out gap after gap: thus, a single section (3-805) provides the
whole almost unknown but still needed body of law on non-negotiable bills and non-negotiable notes which thus far has lain hidden
in a couple of hundred scattered and badly indexed cases. Again,
that constant country-wide battleground of the last forty years - the
"open term" on price or time or quantity or assortment of goods
under "contract" for sale - has been taken care of in such cleanly and
businesslike fashion that it has struck from the experienced house
counsel of one major national manufacturer the comment, "This
alone would justify the whole Code."
The Barand Commercial Law
As has been indicated, the achievements of the uniform commercial acts have been gratifying. But they do not warrant even a touch
of complacency or smugness. Certainly not for the bar. For the
times have been moving; it seems almost as if the times had been
moving with malice upon and against the bar. Lawyers can at a
pinch make out with the increasing flow of current decisions in the
reports; the number of courts is, after all, limited, and so is the time
of each of them. But what is the man of law to do with his inundation by new fields of governmental activity, local, state, and national,
with the shifting tides of statutes about everything and anything, with
the tidal wave of regulatory gobbledy-gook that may control, even
though it never gets beyond the state of mimeo- or multigraph? As
the bulk and especially the variety of pertinent rule-material has
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proliferated, of rule-material in perennial shift and flux, the need becomes overwhelming to find for quick use at need some body of
relatively compact, relatively accessible, relatively stable material
which will not cost a week's research time for each ten-minute or
ten-dollar consultation. It is, I think, fair to state that in the smallish
patches within which they operate the bulk of the current uniform
commercial acts accomplish a good deal along this line. But their
coverage is too scanty to meet the need. Moreover, even the excellent
and broad N. I. L. has obsolesced in sixty years, and over its more
heavily litigated portions the crust of case law is thick and frequently
confusing. On either count alone, doubly on their combination, a
fresh start is imperative. And, as will appear hereinafter, the present
condition of sales law is from the standpoint of prediction and counseling not only bafflingly obscure but, when light once gets achieved,
alarming.
In result, the pressures of the times and of newer legal activities
have moved the great body of the bar away from contact with the
law of commerce and of commercial finance. Except to the occasional
expert, it has become unknown country, and most points in it are
embarrassingly hard to locate and to evaluate with any speed. The
most striking single observation that emerges from my seventeen
years of work on the production and discussion of the Code is the
number of lawyers at committee and bar association meetings dealing
with the Code to whom an accurate statement of the state of the law
on points of sales or banking or security or securities came as a shock:
more frequently, they knew they did not know and were surprised
and displeased, or else - less frequently - they knew what simply was
not so, and so were really shocked.' The number I refer to has run in
high percentage of the lawyers present; it has mounted, over the years,
in absolute figures, into the thousands. The meaning is that what
used to be standard equipment at the bar has become by slow drift the
property and prerogative of a relative few, the specialists, and that it
is high time indeed for the Code to make this body of law accessible
and moderately dear.
There is another piece of meaning. That is, that adverse critiI think of a leading lawyer in the field who took the flat and fighting position
that the bar and the profession would never tolerate a provision that a mere signature would serve as a blank stock power. He had to be shown that such a provision
in the Stock Transfer Act was law in 48 states. It should be noted that even Paton's
admirable and indispensable Digest is outstanding for the number of situations in
which the available opinion has to run in terms of non-certainty.
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cism of the Code in terms of how it compares with the existing law
is criticism which should be watched carefully for its source, and with
a particular eye to the question, Is the assumed present state of the
law in fact the real present state of the law? Informed criticism of
the Code, whether in such careful and hard-working committees as
those of the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and those of the
Chicago Bar Association or in the careful and informed detailed
studies in the law reviews and the various state annotations, has with
amazing regularity taken a consistent and very comforting course all
over the country.
The informed critics find the Code to contain much less innovation
than anybody would think who did not happen to know the better
and more commercial case law. The informed critics then go on,
again regularly, to approve some three quarters to four fifths of the
choices made by the Code, and to divide as to the rest somewhat evenly
among neutrality, skepticism, and sharp disapproval. The exciting
thing next to notice is that the points disapproved do not cumulate,
but vary from critic to critic. What this comes to is that the democratic process which produced the Code - over a period of more than
fifteen years, out of the labors of more than fifteen hundred skillful
lawyers - has been a process whose end result - thank God - leaves

unsatisfied some desires of any lawyer and of any committee of lawyers.
The fifteen hundred others have been heard, and have proved persuasive.2
2There are upwards of a hundred material places on which as Chief Reporter
I was outvoted on a position I believed in and was fighting for. I doubt if time and
thought have brought me round on as many as one sixth of such points; a good
twenty and more still cause grief which is acute. But it should give any person
comfort in regard to the probable wisdom even of details which he finds bothersome to realize that such details represent, regularly, repeated majority votes of
different but highly intelligent bodies of lawyers, after informed and sustained
meditation and discussion. Approval was obtained only after the "long tour" over
(I) central drafting staff, (2) advisors' committee, (3) Commercial Acts or Property
Section of the Conference, (4) Council of the Institute, (5) the floor-and typically
twice to the floor, each time after the full prior tour. That long tour was avoided
by only relatively few sections during the process of final revision. Even that last
"speedy tour" was not so speedy. It represented typically a full discussion in either
the New York Law Revision Commission or the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce
Committee, followed by a full discussion in the relevant subcommittee of the
sponsors, followed by a discussion in the Enlarged Joint Editorial Board, which
was very far indeed from rubber-stamping; and the subcommittees and Joint Editorial Board went over the great bulk of the material twice, with long pondering
time between.
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PRACTICE UNDER THE CODE

The TechnicalForm

One worry to any lawyer, when he faces up to legislation of any
volume, is the question of how to find what he may need, and above
all the question of how the parts hang together and how he may be
sure - without seven months of anticipatory study - that when using

one part he will not be overlooking something else which not only
bears on but perhaps may unexpectedly decide his problem. On this
the Uniform Commercial Code carries as complete a set of aids and
safeguards as any statute ever put forward in this country.
The section captions are given full value as parts of the Code
(Section 1-109). They are rather full. They have been worked over,
again and again, by many different hands, to make sure that there is
some attention-challenging word or phrase in the caption to guide to
each piece of material in the section. In result an alphabetical index
is bound to be remarkably complete, regardless of whether the indexer
has skill.
The Code comes, moreover, accompanied by a comment on every
section, prepared, as was the Code itself, under the joint auspices of
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the
American Law Institute. These comments are very useful in presenting
something of the background and purposes of the sections, and of the
way in which the details and policies build into a whole. In these
aspects they greatly aid understanding and construction. But on the
point here under direct consideration they are priceless. They signal
every word in the section which is for Code purposes a term of art,
and tell where each such term is defined. They provide also a painstaking set of cross-references to other relevant material in the Code.
This is in addition to references to relevant sections of prior uniform
commercial acts.
The lawyer's problem is not really met, however, even by making
sure that all passages in point are forced to his attention, together
with their reasons. And the Code project has proceeded to go far
beyond the Code, in order to serve the lawyer. Already produced and

in process of production is a whole series of materials on "Wise
Practice Under the Code."
Counselingand Results

Discussion of the N. I. L. has rarely pointed out one striking
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fact about that statute: it divides into two completely different portions. One part is addressed in first instance to courts and lays down in good part in wisely general language- guidance for decisions in
disputes in court. The other portion, though it also guides a court,
comes close to being a manual for bankers' practice- for example,
in regard to proceedings on dishonor. There is no question that one
large portion of the value of the N. I. L. has lain in this guidance for
operation under it, nor is there question that one of the most unhappy
lacks in our legal literature is the scantiness of information about
what advice some expert has given in the situation with good results the scantiness of the kind of information which is one main feature
of any practitioner's text on medicine ("Dr. Cox's procedure," "the
Katzendorff transfusion," etc.).
Now if there be one feature of the Uniform Commercial Code
which ought to line up for its immediate adoption every lawyer in
any state except the two to four dozen true experts who no longer
need such help, it is that the Code comes - over and above the comments - companioned with this kind of expert, articulate, and detailed guidance on procedure under its provisions.
This is partly a product of the personnel who have been in key
positions in the drafting and who have in consequence tended strongly
to shape the structure and much of the drafting method. Such key
personnel have been familiar with practical commercial and financial
operations and needs and have organized the material and for the
most part phrased it to guide operation as well as decision; indeed,
so far as accuracy and time have permitted, to guide a layman along
with his counsel. For this the above mentioned portions of the
N. I. L. served as stimulus and model.
But there is much more. Save for minor revisions, the Code has
been in form to use since 1952, and in use in Pennsylvania since 1953.
Pennsylvania was a curiously happy commonwealth to serve as a
general tryout jurisdiction, ranging in activity as it does from the
metropolitan to the mountain-rural, from the heaviest industry to the
lightest, and to varied farming. The Code has therefore been tested
in workability and in result in a way in which no other "novel" statute ever offered to the country has been tested. Occasional difficulties
have developed, and remedies have been devised therefor, by years
of high-powered study by committees of banking counsel and of the
Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce. 3 Three observations emerge,
3The results of these studies, as well as those by the New York Law Revision
Commission, are incorporated in the 1957 Official Edition of the Code.
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after this longish period of use and of intensive study:
(1) Among the practical experts there is no suggestion that the
Code be repealed.
(2) The process of adjusting practice and advice to the Code
has not been found difficult, and prevailing opinion runs
among the experts to the belief that the Code has materially
increased, not decreased, certainty.
(3) The values of the Code in the home-Commonwealth are
felt to greatly outweigh the fact that non-Code law still
prevails across the borders.
This might seem to be enough. But, as suggested, there is more
which is of curious value.
Thus, for instance, there is available in printed form the experience, and the judgment and recommendations for operation under
the Code, of one of the leading banking counsel in Pennsylvania.
There is available (though in the current edition it rests on an Article
9 which has since been somewhat amended in relevant portions) a
superb practice manual in regard to chattel security operation under
the Code. Business forms built to fit Article 2 on Sales have been
prepared and can be secured, and an elaborate discussion of sales
practice under that article is in preparation. Thus before any 1959
legislature can adopt the Code, and certainly before any appropriate
effective date (one year being decently allowed for bar and business
readjustment), it is to be expected on most matters that short, cheap
manuals will be ready: ready to provide the Uniform Commercial
Code - itself a truly commercial and commercially intelligible statute- with an implementation in cheap and simple terms for sound
commercial and financial use which will surpass that available currently for any body of law in these United States.Let a lawyer, finally, consider this - the entire library needed for
effective practice under the Code will take up six inches of shelf
space: an inch for text and comments, a half-inch each for the straight
text, the annotations to past local law, the manual on sales, the
manual on commercial banking, and a miscellaneous manual, with
a final whole inch (at most) for the manual on chattel security. All
for the price of any ordinary treatise.
4Consult the American Law Institute for the most recent information and plans
in regard to this type of material.
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CONTENT AND ARRANGEMENT

What is the content of this Uniform Commercial Code? Certain
obviously vital fields of commerce are out by virtue of our federal
system and its tradition: thus it is not for a uniform state law to deal
with the carriage of goods by sea, the contract for interstate carriage,
or with marine insurance, or with bankruptcy. Business organization
and insurance on goods otherwise than in carriage are omitted because local insistence on state control of the business corporation and
of the insurance business are too firmly established to make uniform
legislation seem possible. In essence, then, the Code carries forward
and supplements the fields already occupied by one or another of
the widely adopted commercial statutes.
The heart of the Code - though it has been less discussed than the
banking provisions - is Article 2, on Sales, the movement of wares
in commerce, the subject-matter of the old Uniform Sales Act and of
the more-than-century-old early Factors Acts (on the last compare
Sections 2-403, 7-205, and 7-503). The current law of sales is curiously
blind in regard to disputes between buyer and seller, making the
answer turn technically on when the property in the goods is to pass,
which in turn depends on the intentions of the parties on the matter,
which, finally, is a matter to which the parties (except in conditional
sales) do not address attention and on which they therefore have no intention at all. In addition the law of remedies in sales cases is technical, tricky, and inadequate (in spite of Waite's masterly effort to gather
the more usable cases into formative shape). Finally, there are scattered through the field an unpleasant number of technical traps for
a buyer or seller who is operating merely on horse sense, business
knowledge, and good faith. The result has been that for more than
half a century commercial sales disputes have tended increasingly and
overwhelmingly to move out of the courts into arbitration or trade
association adjustment - except in time of market crisis. In such
times of crisis, however, the technical traps come to light, the cases
come to court, and the results, despite all efforts of the courts, repeatedly "do make each several hair stand up on end." Article 2
of the Code, rejecting that part of the legal tradition of the field
which rests on Ellenborough and Benjamin, picks up the more commercial line of legal tradition which traces out of Mansfield and Blackburn, in this country out of Parker, Cowen, Hough, and Hand. The
rules between seller and buyer are stated in terms of the issues and of
the facts which sellers and buyers do think about; technical traps are
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eliminated; good faith interpretation and action are protected so far as
circumstances will permit; and if it does come to litigation the remedies are made flexible and are freed from delay, trickery, and technicality. Article 2 deserves the praise which that great commercial
lawyer Hiram Thomas gave it.5
The storage of goods and those phases of carriage which affect
buyer, seller, and financer are carried forward from the present Warehouse Receipts and Bills of Lading and Pomerene Acts with relatively
few changes and with material useful supplement.
The financing of commerce, however, comes in for vigorous and
novel treatment. Drafts with bills of lading attached receive new
codification in accordance with practice and need (Article 4, Part 5),
and the discount "subject to charge-back" situation is explicitly made
to protect a banker who acts in good faith (Section 1-201 (44)).
Bonded warehousing practice is recognized (Section 7-201). And, especially, the whole of Article 9 brings into simplified and workable form
the law of all chattel security, whether the asset be tangible, or be a
single contract or accounts receivable transferred at wholesale or other
intangibles; whether it be farm produce (grown or future), or raw or
finished merchandise. It is interesting, in view of the opening up
of blanket chattel liens by these provisions, to find the Pennsylvania
members of the National Association of Credit Men reporting to
their association in favor of the Code: its central notice-filing provisions make it cheap and easy for the prospective seller to find out
just where he is at.6 And it will be recalled that Article 5, the new,
simple, and flexible codification of the law of letters of credit, offers
the needed machinery for financing any later single delivery which
might be endangered by the blanket lien. Meantime, Article 6 picks
up the direct interest of the unsecured creditor by offering a modernized and very pretty version of a Bulk Sales Act.
Articles 3 and 8, on Commercial Paper and Investment Securities,
grow, as has been indicated, out of the existing N. I. L. and Uniform
Stock Transfer Act, the latter being expanded to cover all types of
investment securities and also to deal with the machinery of transfer
and reissue in the case of stock and of registered bonds. Article 4
on Bank Collections picks up and organizes in modern fashion that
wholesale handling of payment-paper which we know as "the collec5The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 2 Business Lawyer, No. 3,p. 16 (July,

1947). Article 2 has not been changed materially since Thomas wrote.
GlIn 59 Credit and Financial Management, 16 (29 Dec. 1957), Roper reports on
his inquiries.
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tion-float." The essential theory of law there applied is that the whole
public which consumes bankers' services is best served by speed and
by such rules as make for maximum speed in the non-trouble-making
case.
But it would be unfortunate and misleading to leave even such
a cursory survey of content as this without giving a few illustrations
in passing of the kind of service to the lawyer, businessman, and
banker which the Code performs, so to speak, with effects as little
noticed but as pleasant as a nice girl's friendly greeting. Let me start
with Article 3, of which a general description might be merely that
it concisely states the better case law under the N. I. L., cures a few
old blobs, and rounds out and clears up operating questions in the
event of dishonor. Take Section 3-105 on "unconditional." It clears
up the vexing "as per" question. It settles the mean question, never
yet litigated, of the draft that refers on its face to a specific letter of
credit, which in turn states explicit conditions. It gives status to instruments limited to a particular government source or to the assets
of an association or of a trust or of an estate. Section 3-107 clears up the
question of an amount stated in terms of a foreign currency. Section
3-110 gives status to instruments drawn abroad without the magic
word "order," but which state that they are "exchange." (The N. I. L.
forgot those.) The section also gives status to an instrument drawn to
the order of a trust or estate. It kills the crazy rule that a certificate of
deposit is negotiable because it calls, before payment, for indorsement
by the payee, and kills also the ugly possibility that those check
forms which add "or bearer" at the end of the payee line can thereby
free the drawer from responsibility for genuineness of the payee's
signature.
This short series of little but vital improvements in convenience,
clarity, sense, completeness, or all four, is typical of any sequence of
sections anywhere in the Code. The total of such matters approaches
or reaches four figures. It is astounding. Nobody talks about it. Even
an expert reviewer of a single article is likely to find three quarters or
nine tenths of such matters to call for no mention: they are not controversial, nor one by one are they large; they are just nice. But in
cumulation, in heaped-up, mountainous cumulation, they become
terrific: terrific in their majestic contribution.
THE NET

Let me sum up, paying for the moment no attention to the pos-
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sibility that other states have adopted or may adopt the Code. Let me
use Pennsylvania only to show satisfaction with the Code's substance

and form, and to demonstrate that such satisfaction runs happily
free from what men think or do in Wall Street. Let me use Massachusetts only to show that commercial lawyers, bankers, warehousemen, stock brokers, businessmen, and labor unions who examine the

Uniform Commercial Code carefully on its merits find it good.
(1) If all the Code did had been to put into clear and accessible form some rule on the several thousand points it
covers, that would alone, in the present state of the bar's
knowledge and of the law's inaccessibility, make it worth
adoption.
(2) If all the Code did had been to clear up confusion and
pick the wiser rule and cure obsolete and unfair rules
which lay traps, in regard to the hundreds of points on
which it does one or all of these things, that would alone,
in the present condition of commercial law, make the Code
worth adoption.
(3) If all the Code did had been to reorganize the law of sales,
collections, investment securities, and chattel security to
fit modem need and for easy use, that would alone make it
worth adopting.
(4) If all the Code did had been to elicit and make available
that body of accessible wisdom on how to handle the counseling phases of commerce and commercial finance which
has been built around the Code, that alone, in the present
state of legal literature, would make the Code worth
adopting.
But the Code does each of these things. It does them all at once.
To this, one adds the very interesting section on Parties' Power
to Choose Applicable Law (Section 1-105(1)), and one meditates
further on the high probability that 1959 will become "Code Year"
in these United States.

HeinOnline -- 10 U. Fla. L. Rev. 381 1957

